Procon Corporation v. Utah Department of Transportaion : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Procon Corporation v. Utah Department of
Transportaion : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert F. Babcock; Randy B. Birch; Walstatd and Babcock; Attorneys for Appellee.
Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Leland D. Ford; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Procon Corporation v. Utah Department of Transportaion, No. 920758 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3744
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
I ,';0KET NO. ^2XTl6e> 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
92-0758-CA PROCON CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant/Appellant 
CA 
(Supreme Court No. 920190) 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
LELAND D. FORD 
Assistant Attorney General 
4120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
ROBERT F. BABCOCK 
RANDY B. BIRCH 
Walstad and Babcock 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee 
NOV 91992 
.;ocnan 
e Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROCON CORPORATION, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
\ CA 
: (Supreme Court No. 920190) 
: Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
LELAND D. FORD 
Assistant Attorney General 
4120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
ROBERT F. BABCOCK 
RANDY B. BIRCH 
Walstad and Babcock 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
of the Trial Court 4 
C. Designation of the Parties 6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
ARGUMENT • 14 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 14 
I. PROCON FAILED TO NOTIFY UDOT OF ITS INTENTION 
TO CLAIM ADDED COMPENSATION FOR AN ALLEGED 
CHANGE IN THE LOCATION OF THE AREA DESIGNATED 
IN THE PLANS FOR THE PLACEMENT OF WASTE 
MATERIAL, AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTRACT, AND 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED 
THEREON SHOULD BE REVERSED 15 
A. Sections 104.02(4) and 105.17 of the 
Standard Specifications Applicable To 
The Contract Require The Contractor 
To Notify The Engineer Of The 
Contractor's Intention To Claim Added 
Compensation If The Contractor 
Disagrees With Changes Or Directives 
Made By The Engineer 16 
B. The Engineer For UDOT Did Not 
Consider The Extension Of The Waste 
Area To Be A Compensable Change Under 
Sections 104.02 or 105.17 17 
-ii-
C. Finding of Fact Number 21 Which Found 
That UDOT Was On Notice That The 
Change In The Waste Area Would 
Increase Procon's Cost Of Performance 
Is In Error Because UDOT Was Never 
Informed Either Verbally Or In 
Writing That Procon Intended To Claim 
Added Compensation For The 
Alleged Change During The Project 22 
II. THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR A CHANGE IN 
THE SLOPE ANGLE IS IN ERROR AND IS BASED ON 
PERJURED TESTIMONY 32 
III. THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS INFLUENCED 
BY PASSION OR PREJUDICE AND BY UNWARRANTED 
FEELINGS OF SYMPATHY TOWARD THE RESPONDENT . . . . 38 
IV. THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR OVERTIME 
WORK IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE, IS NOT EQUITABLE, AND RESULTS 
IN A PENALTY 43 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Bates v. Brown Shoe Co.. 1216 S.W.2d 31 4^ 
Brawlev v. Esterly. Mo.. 267 S.W.2d 655 (Mo.) 42 
Contracting Materials Co. v. City of Chicago. 314 N.E.2d 
598 (111. 1974) 43 
Highland Construction v. LaMar D. Stevenson, et al.. 
636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981) 37 
Highland Construction v. Union Pacific R. Co.. et al.. 
683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984) 41 
In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) 29 
Maryland Department of General Services v. Cherry Hill 
Sand & Gravel. 443 A.2d 628 (Md. App. 1982) 37 
Nat Harrison Associates. Inc. v. Gulf States Utilities Co.. 
491 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1974) 46 
Reeder v. Ramsey. 458 N.E.2d 682 (Ind. App. 1984) 21 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989) . . . . 24,29 
State v. Bertal. 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983) 28,29 
State ex rel. Marguez. 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 1977) . T . . . . 28 
State v. Mitchell. 769 P.2d 817 (Utah 1989) 29 
State v. Omega Painting. Inc.. 463 N.E.2d 287 
(Ind. App. 1984) 20,21 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 29 
Thorn Construction Company v. Utah Department of 
Transportation. 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) passim 
Watson Lumber v. Guenmewig. 226 N.E. 2d 270 
(111. App. 1967) 21 
West v. St. Louis Public Service Co.. 236 S.W.2d 
308 (Mo. Sup.) 43 
Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co.. 236 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Sup.) 29 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 52(a) 29 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 803(6) 28 
AUTHORITIES 
Bruner, Allen and Sand, Acceleration. Government Contractor 
Briefing Papers No. 81-2 (Federal Publications, 1981) . . 46 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROCON CORPORATION, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has Jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the lower Court erred, as a matter of law, 
in admitting exhibit 18-P (a letter dated April 14, 1986 which 
purports to give notice of Plaintiff-Appellees intention to seek 
added payment for moving the waste disposal area) in view of a 
lack of foundation to admit said exhibit. 
2. Whether the lower Court erred, as a matter of law, 
in its award of damages for moving the waste area which is based 
on its Finding of Fact No. 21, which states that Defendant-
Appellant was on notice that the change in the waste area 
location would increase the cost of performance as a result of 
exhibit 18-P when Appellant's engineer testified he had neither 
seen the said letter nor been verbally informed to that effect, 
and the purported author of the said letter could not recall the 
letter nor events referred to therein. 
3. Whether the lower Court erred, both as a matter of 
law and factually, in awarding damages for the change in the 
slope angle of the sliver cut in view of the fact that the 
evidence supporting the decision of the court is based upon the 
perjured testimony of James Didericksen which is contrary to all 
of the other evidence. 
4. Whether the lower Court erred in awarding damages, 
the amount of which appears to be influenced by passion and 
prejudice and expressed feelings of sympathy toward the 
Plaintiff-Appellee. 
5. Whether the Court erred, as a matter of law, in 
awarding damage based upon the testimony of Gaylord Gardner, 
which testimony was based on a total cost type approach and which 
assumed facts not in evidence. 
6. Whether the Court erred, both as a matter of law 
and fact, in awarding damages for overtime incurred by Plaintiff-
Appellee when it failed to complete the work within the time 
allowed after a substantial increase in contract time. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review for the first, second, fourth, 
fifth and sixth issues on appeal is a correction of error 
standard.1 The standard of review for the third issue on 
1Western Kane County Special Service District v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2 1376 (Utah 1987); Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2 138 
(Utah App. 1989.) 
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appeal is a clearly erroneous standard.2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a highway construction contract case. Procon 
Corporation (Procon), and the Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) entered into a contract on March 11, 1986, for the 
realignment of a failed section of highway number 276 in San Juan 
County near Clay Hills Pass. The contract involved the 
excavation of a "sliver cut" and the widening of a fill to 
realign the roadway. Excess material was to be placed in a 
compacted fill as specified in the plans. 
The contract allowed 90 working days for completion of 
the work. Procon exceeded the allowed time by 71 working days. 
In early 1987, Procon's bonding company became insolvent. Procon 
was unable to provide substitute payment and performance bonds. 
The contract was terminated by agreement effective January 1, 
1987, with a reservation of rights by each party. UDOT completed 
the project in 1987. Procon filed a claim for added compensation 
totaling in excess of 2.2 million dollars, three times the amount 
of the original contract. UDOT employed an engineering firm to 
review Procon's claim. Their independent conclusion was that 
Procon's claims were not well founded, and UDOT rejected them in 
total. 
At trial Procon claimed that because of changes made in 
2This standard, as it applies to the Perjured testimony of 
James Didericksen and the Courts view concerning same is analyzed 
beginning at page 32 of Appellant's brief. 
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the location of the waste disposal area and sliver cut slope 
angle, it incurred added expense. Procon alleged errors in the 
plans were misleading and caused added expense. Procon's 
evidence concerning damages at trial was approximately 1/3 of the 
amount it claimed initially. UDOT denied responsibility for 
Procon's damages. UDOT asserted the plans were adequate for 
their intended purpose and that Procon's damages related to their 
choice of equipment and method of operation. UDOT alleged Procon 
had notice of the slope angle change prior to bidding and 
asserted that the change made by UDOT's engineer in the location 
of the waste disposal area was not a material change. 
UDOT alleged it did not receive written notice of 
Procon's intent to claim added compensation for changes made by 
the engineer as required by the contract. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Trial Court 
The case was tried to the Court on July 9-12 and 16, 
1991. 
Procon's owner and principal officer, James 
Didericksen, testified concerning performance of the contract, 
the effect of changes in the contract, and conditions encountered 
which he claimed were different from the plans. He alleged that 
Procon's damages exceeded two million dollars and that he and his 
wife had lost everything and still owed numerous creditors. 
Procon's two expert witnesses used various methods to 
assess damages, including the use of assumed facts by the witness 
Gaylord Gardner. The range of opinion varied between 
4 
approximately $500,000 and $721,000, 
UDOT's engineer testified that he informed prospective 
bidders including Procon of the slope change in the "sliver cut 
section" prior to the bid. The Court relied on Didericksen's 
obviously perjured testimony concerning this pre-bid conversation 
and ignored all other evidence and awarded damages for the 
change. 
The UDOT engineer provided for a slope to support 
placement of the waste material as required by the plans. The 
slope extends beyond the designated waste location. UDOT's 
engineer did not receive verbal or written notice that Procon 
viewed the change as a compensable change, and he did not 
consider the extension to be a material or compensable change. 
The Court admitted a letter in evidence, as a business record, 
over objection by UDOT's counsel. The letter purports to put 
UDOT on notice of Procon's intent to claim added compensation. 
The purported author of the letter did not recall the letter nor 
events and facts referred to in the letter when his deposition 
was taken prior to trial and did not testify at trial. No other 
evidence of any kind was presented in support of the letter or, 
to show that Procon notified UDOT of its intent to claim added 
compensation for the said change. 
The Court adopted the testimony of Gaylord Gardner as 
the measure of damages for the waste area change even though 
Gardner admitted his opinion was based on assumptions which are 
not part of the evidence. 
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A post-trial motion by UDOT sought a modification of 
the judgment and permission to supplement the record with 
evidence referred to during the course of the trial. The Court 
admitted the supplementary evidence but refused to modify or 
change the judgment of $721,478.00 plus interest. 
C Designation of the Parties 
Procon Corporation was the Plaintiff in the trial and 
is the Appellee here, and hereafter throughout this brief, will 
be referred to as Procon. 
The Utah Department of Transportation was the Defendant 
at trial, is the Appellant here, and will hereafter be referred 
to as UDOT throughout this brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
a. Procon and UDOT entered into a contract on or about 
March 11, 1986 in the amount of $719,000 for repair work and 
realignment to State Road 276 in San Juan County. Said project 
is a federally-aided project designated as Project Number ER-
052 (1), Clay Hills Pass3 
b. The project consisted of excavation into an 
existing cut face and the realignment of the highway in the cut 
section as well as the widening of a fill as the roadway emerges 
from the cut. The entire project limits encompass a length of 
approximately one-half mile. The project was necessitated 
because the existing roadway, part of which was built on fill, 
'Findings of Fact (Findings) 11 3, 7, 8, and Ex. 3-P. 
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was slipping into a drainage channel. 
c. The cut section is referred to as a "sliver cut." 
It increases in width as the roadway proceeds down through the 
cut section. The height of the existing cut face was 
approximately 200 feet above the existing roadway at its deepest 
point5 
d. The fill section was approximately 200 feet deep at 
the toe of the widened fill section. The fill required to 
accommodate the roadway is widest at the point where the newly 
aligned roadway emerges from the cut and narrows progressively 
until it meets the original alignment several hundred feet east 
of the cut6 
e. The plans specified that the waste material was to 
be disposed of "right of highway stations 864+25 through 867+25." 
Right of Station 867+25 approximately, the mountain drops away 
and the roadway emerges from the cut. The plans also specified 
that fill slopes were to be sloped at an angle of 2~to 1; that 
cut slopes over 5 feet in depth were to be excavated at an angle 
of 1/2 to l; and that the roadway section was to be compacted to 
95% density and the waste material was to be compacted to 90% 
density7 
f. Procon's owner James Didericksen, Larry Fillmore, a 
4Findings 1 12# Ex. 2-P and Ex. 3-P. 
5Ex. 2-P. 
6Exhibit 2-P. 
7Findings 1 12, Ex. 2-P and Ex. 3-P. 
7 
Procon employee, and Abde Fatemi, an employee of Staker 
Contracting, visited the project site prior to preparing and 
submitting their bids in the company of Hugh Kirkham, the 
Resident Engineer for UDOT. Kirkham informed them during the 
visit, among other things, that the sliver cut was to be removed 
at an angle to match the existing slope (which was 1 to 1) 
contrary to the plans which specified 1/2 to l8 
g. At the time of the site visit, stakes were in place 
showing the centerline of the new highway alignment. Stakes were 
in place in the cut section which defined the configuration of 
the cut section at the top of^the cut. Such stakes are referred 
to as "slope" stakes. Stakes were not in place in the fill area 
except for the new centerline9 
h. The notes of the site visit, prepared by Procon's 
owner James Didericksen, state that, "Mr. Kirkham, P.E. pointed 
out area by showing centerline stakes cut slope 1:1 approx 200' 
fill gorge 200' deep." and: "Cut area beginning at sliver cut 
approx 200' exist rd. maintain approx 1:1 slope. Also a diagram 
on p. 11 shows the cut area with notations of 1:1 slope and 200' 
top. Also fill area, 200' deep, Embankment 95%, Waste area 90% 
compaction.10 
i. Didericksen admitted in his deposition that he was 
informed by Kirkham of the slope angle change during the pre-bid 
8R. 6 4 2 - 6 4 4 , F i n d i n g s 1 2 5 . 
9R. 6 3 3 - 6 3 5 , 647 . 
10Ex. 8-P, p p . 7, 1 0 , 1 1 . 
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site visit.11 Didericksen claimed that they contacted Kirkham 
prior to bid opening by telephone to ascertain if an addendum to 
the plans had been issued covering the slope angle change and 
that Kirkham said no and that they were to "bid it as drawn."12 
The said phone call was allegedly made by Larry Fillmore.13 
Kirkham stated that he did not recall any telephone conversation 
with Fillmore or Didericksen prior to bid opening. He stated his 
intent was always to require that the slope be excavated on a 1 
to 1 angle.14 
j. UDOT Standard Specifications authorize the engineer 
to make directed changes to plans and obligate the contractor to 
comply with such directives subject to certain restrictions.15 
k. At trial# Didericksen, testified that the slope 
angle change was not discussed with Kirkham prior to bid opening. 
This is contrary to his deposition, his pre-trial notes and 
Kirkham's testimony.16 
1. Exhibit 18-P is a letter dated April 14f 1986, a 
copy of which was found in Procon's files, and which was prepared 
for the signature of Larry Fillmore. Said letter states in part: 
". . .we have been informed by Bill Thomas of a directed change 
11R. 959. 
12R. 959-960. 
13R. 649-650. 
14R. 649-650. 
15Ex. 5-P, Sec t ion 104 .02 . 
16R. 619. 
9 
in the location of the designated waste fill area from that which 
is indicated on Sheet 3 of the bid plans. These changes will us 
impact [sic] significantly; therefore, we will keep track of 
costs and inform you as to the impact at a later date once they 
have been determined."17 
m. No copy of the said April 14, 1986, letter exists 
in UDOT files. Hugh Kirkham testified that he did not receive 
the said letter during performance of the work and did not see it 
until April 1990 when Procon's counsel produced it during 
discovery. He also stated that no verbal objection was ever made 
to him about this alleged change or extension in the location of 
the waste area by anyone associated with Procon until after the 
work was done.18 
Counsel objected to the said letter when preferred at 
trial based on lack of foundation.19 The purported author, 
Fillmore, did not appear at trial and no one else testified to 
its origin, preparation or mailing. After initially ruling in 
favor of UDOT, the Court reversed itself and admitted the 
letter.20 
n. The plans specify that fill slopes are to be placed 
at an angle of 2 to 1. Because the terrain east and south of the 
cut drops as much as 200 feet, the required slope extends up to 
17Findings, 1 21 and Ex. 18-P. 
18R. 657-658. 
19R. 317-321. 
20R. 610-611. 
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400 feet to the east.21 Kirkham staked the slope to begin 
against the widened fill slope of the new roadway alignment and 
extended it to the south.22 Kirkham did not perceive the slope 
extension which was necessary to support the waste fill as a 
compensable change or as a material change since Procon had to 
haul material to build the roadway fill to the same elevation as 
the waste fill designated in the plans.23 
o. UDOT Standard Specifications which are part of the 
contract require written notice by the contractor as a pre-
condition to a claim for added compensation when a "change in 
plan or in the character of construction" is directed by the 
engineer. Failure to give the requisite notice is considered a 
waiver of the claim.24 
p. Procon's testimony at trial was that the said 
change in the location of the waste area forced a change in their 
method of operation and that they were required to haul material 
which they planned to push with a bulldozer, and that this was 
much more costly. Procon's witnesses estimated as much as 
$507,300.25 UDOT's witness, Norman Clyde, recognized some 
$3,500 in added haul costs.26 
21R. 652-653. 
^R. 693-694. 
aR. 685-686. 
24See Sec t ion 105.17, Exhibit 5-P. 
25Findings 1 20, 24 . 
26R. 823-825. 
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q. The contract specified 90 working days to complete 
the work. A total of 161 working days were charged to the 
project as of December 1, 1986 when time charges were 
suspended.27 Procon's bonding company thereafter became 
insolvent, and Procon was unable to replace the payment and 
performance bonds so the contract was terminated by agreement as 
of January 1# 1987.28 
r. After the project was completed, Procon was granted 
added time, because of increased quantities of roadway excavation 
and for added work totaling 14.68 days.29 This resulted in the 
assessment of 56.32 days of liquidated damages rather than 71 
days. Hugh Kirkham testified that he had not formally responded 
to Procon's requests for added time during the project 
performance since time extensions required federal approval and 
it was his judgment that it would have been better to seek one 
extension at the end.30 He stated that as much as 60 days 
would be reasonable.31 With a total extension of 60 days, 
Procon would still have been liable for 11 days of liquidated 
damages. 
s. At the time of the pre-bid site visit, Hugh Kirkham 
stated that the contractor who constructed the road initially had 
27R. 665. 
28Findings 1 52. 
29R. 169. 
30R. 663-666. 
31R. 687. 
12 
successfully ripped the material in the cut with Caterpillar D-9 
tractors and a single tooth ripper32. Procon did not use D-9 
tractors but used a Komatsu 155 Tractor and encountered 
difficulty in ripping some of the material in the cut.33 As a 
result, Procon elected to drill and blast material, which Procon 
alleged caused an increase in cost of $116,000.^ UDOT 
contended that the decision to rip or to blast is the 
contractor's choice and not the responsibility of UDOT.35 
t. The court awarded Procon a judgment totalling 
$721,478.00 plus interest following the trial. Included in said 
sum is $507,300 for the 300-foot extension in the waste area 
location, $43,750 for added costs associated with the change in 
the angle of excavation in the sliver cut, $116,000 for the cost 
of blasting and $33,000 for overtime incurred in an effort to 
complete the project within allowable time, which they did not 
do.36 
u. UDOT filed a motion to have the court reconsider 
the damage award and also objected to certain of Procon's 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.37 The Court heard said 
^R. 645. 
33R. 680-682. 
*R. 314. 
35Ex. 36-P. 
36Findings 11 24, 31 , 40, 50, 51; Conclusions of Law H 8, 
12 • 
37R. 110-176. 
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Motion and UDOT's OBJECTION TO PROCON'S COST BILL, on February 
14, 1992, and rejected UDOT's Motion in total except as to 
Procon's Cost Bill. 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Procon encountered difficulty in performing the work 
because it lacked adequate equipment and its concept of 
operations was unrealistic and ill-conceived. Procon's method of 
operations involved excess handling of material and as a result 
its daily production was only one-half of the amount on which its 
bid was premised. This resulted in greatly elevated levels of 
direct and indirect costs. 
Deficiencies in the plans and specifications were not a 
contributing factor to Procon's job performance. The plans were 
adequate for their intended purpose and were such that a 
reasonably competent contractor could easily perform the work. 
Changes made by UDOT's engineer in the field were 
typical of the type of changes routinely made in highway 
construction. They were either not of a material or significant 
nature, or in the case of the change in the slope angle in the 
"sliver cut" area, the change was made and notice communicated in 
time to allow Procon to bid in anticipation of said change. 
UDOT's argument is directed specifically at the lack of 
notice by Procon of its intent to claim added compensation for an 
alleged change in the waste disposal area. UDOT also argues that 
the court erred in admitting a letter which purports to give 
14 
notice into evidence without adequate foundation. 
UDOT also argues that the court's award of damages for 
a change in the slope angle of the sliver cut is in error for the 
reason stated above. UDOT argues further that the court erred in 
admitting evidence of damages based on improper methods of 
calculating same or on assumptions not supported by the evidence. 
UDOT also argues that the court erred in awarding 
damages for overtime wages for the reason that they are 
unwarranted and inequitable. UDOT also alleges that the judgment 
appears to have been rendered under the influence of passion and 
prejudice and unwarranted feelings of sympathy to Procon which is 
clearly evident in that the court awarded judgment in an amount 
which approximately doubled the original bid amount. 
Finally, UDOT seeks a reversal of damages awarded for 
moving the waste area, the change in the angle of excavation in 
the "sliver cut" area and for overtime wages and a dismissal of 
Procon's complaint as to said items. In the alternative, UDOT 
seeks a reversal of the entire judgment and a remand of the case 
to the District Court for a new trial with appropriate 
instructions. 
POINT I. 
PROCON FAILED TO NOTIFY UDOT OF ITS INTENTION 
TO CLAIM ADDED COMPENSATION FOR AN ALLEGED 
CHANGE IN THE LOCATION OF THE AREA DESIGNATED 
IN THE PLANS FOR THE PLACEMENT OF WASTE 
MATERIAL, AS REQUIRED BY THE CONTRACT, AND 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED THEREON 
SHOULD BE REVERSED 
15 
A. Sections 104.02(4) And 105.17 Of The 
Standard Specifications Applicable To The 
Contract Require The Contractor To Notify The 
Engineer Of The Contractors Intention To 
Claim Added Compensation If The Contractor 
Disagrees With Changes Or Directives Made By 
The Engineer. 
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications 
applicable to the contract38 authorizes the Engineer to direct 
changes in quantities, alter details of construction, and to 
change the design of the project at any time. The contractor is 
required to comply with such directives. This power is limited 
by certain restrictions set forth in said section. The 
contractor is obligated to "demand" a supplemental agreement "in 
writing" if the directed change constitutes "A change in the 
nature of the design or in the character of construction which 
measurably increases or decreases the unit cost of performing any 
item of the work."39 The said section also contains the 
following pertinent language: 
Written requests for a supplemental agreement 
under condition (4) shall set forth in detail 
the particulars and character by which the 
work was changed and by what amounts the unit 
costs of the contract items will be altered. 
The failure of the engineer to recognize a 
change in the character of the work when 
ordering alterations in the work shall in no 
way be construed as relieving the contractor 
from his duty and responsibility for filing a 
request for supplemental agreement. 
If a request for additional compensation is 
made by the contractor and the engineer does 
Ex. 5-P, Sec. 104.02. 
>Ex. 5-P, Sec. 104.02(4) . 
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not consider that a change, as ordered, will 
measurably increase or decrease the unit cost 
of performing the work, he may order the work 
to proceed at the contract prices. The 
validity of the claim will be considered in 
accordance with provisions in Section 105.17. 
Section 105.17 of the Standard Specifications is entitled "Claims 
for Adjustment and Disputes."40 It reads as follows in 
pertinent part: 
If, in any case, where the contractor deems 
that additional compensation is due him for 
work or material not clearly covered in the 
contract or not ordered by the engineer as 
extra work as defined herein, the contractor 
shall notify the engineer in writing of his 
intention to make claim for such additional 
compensation before he begins the work on 
which he bases the claim. If such 
notification is not given and the engineer is 
not afforded proper facilities by the 
contractor for keeping strict account of 
actual cost as required, then the contractor 
hereby agrees to waive any claim for such 
additional compensation. (Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed 
as establishing any claim contrary to the 
terms of Subsection 104.02. 
B. The Engineer For UDOT Did Not Consider 
The Extension Of The Waste Area To Be A 
Compensable Change Under Sections 104.02 or 
105.17. 
The central issue involved in this case is whether the 
extension of the waste area beyond the limits of the area 
designated in the plans constitutes a compensable change. In 
fact, $507,300 out of a total principal sum of $721,478.00 
awarded as Judgment is based on this alleged change. 
'Ex. 5-P, Sec. 105.17. 
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The plans41 provide that material excavated from the 
cut section be used in two areas* One area is the new roadway 
embankment necessary to support the new highway alignment in the 
fill area east of the cut section. The extra material from the 
cut section not needed in the highway embankment is referred to 
as a "waste" material. The plans specify that it is to be placed 
"right of highway stations 864+25 through 867+25"42. The waste 
material requires compaction to 90% density, and the roadway 
embankment requires 95% compaction.43 
UDOT's engineer, Hugh Kirkham, explained in his 
testimony at trial that the terrain at engineer station 867+25 
drops away in two directions to the south and to the east. He 
then stated the following: 
At that point was where the waste fill was 
to start to the south, and when you observe 
that, if you did, you had a slope here that 
would be standing vertical. So we determined 
we had to put a 2 to 1 slope easterly to hold 
that. And that's where we began slope 
staking because of the 200 foot height that 
approximates 867, would be put it at about 
400 feet ahead, or around 871• So we 
determined that we'd establish the 2 to 1 
slope for this supporting fill here at this 
point, coming back to meet the daylight area, 
and then carry the slope south on the 2 to 1 
and bring 'em back in where we went with the 
41Ex. 2-P. 
42The first three numbers indicates the base station and 
these are positioned 100 feet apart. In this case, the 
designated area begins 25 feet beyond station 864 and continues 
300 feet to a point 25 feet beyond station 867. 
43Ex. 2-P. 
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daylight,44 
Kirkham also explained in his testimony that the 2 to 1 slope is 
a contract requirement. In response to questions by Procon's 
counsel, he stated the following: 
The typical section says 2 to 1 slope on all 
fills. On typical No. 1, sheet 2, on the 
right hand side it says, 2 to 1 over five 
foot in fills.45 
Question: (Babcock) Is typical 1 reflective 
of waste or embankment? 
Answer: (Kirkham) It's a fill being placed 
on the job so it would be applicable on this 
project either the waste or the embankment. 
That would be on the left. I said that 
wrong. 
Question: (Babcock) It's typical No. 1 on 
the left where it says 2 to 1 over five foot 
fills. Is that correct, Mr. Kirkham? 
Answer: (Kirkham) Yes, that is. 
Judge Young: And the other on the right is 2 
to 1 under five foot cuts. 
Question: (Babcock) It's actually shown on 
an embankment cross section, isn't it? Isn't 
that what typical No. 1 is, through an 
embankment upper cut and the fill off the 
side of an embankment? 
Answer: Yes, it's the typical section for 
the project. 
Question: (Babcock) Is waste material 
placed in a typical section area? 
Answer: It doesn't indicate it but on this 
project it was to be part of the construction 
aR. 652, 653. 
45Sheet 2 is a plan sheet found in Ex. 2-P. 
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so it was applicable to that/6 
Kirkham considered the placement of the 2 to 1 slope to 
be a contract requirement necessary to support the waste material 
which the plans provided was to be placed right of the station's 
previously referred to. 
Kirkham also explained that in his opinion the 
placement of the material in the 2 to 1 slope was no more 
difficult than placing it within the designated waste disposal 
area.47 
This Court in the case of Thorn Const. Co. v. UDOT. 598 
P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) held that where the engineer verbally 
directed a change in the scope of the work that UDOT could not 
rely on the lack of written notice as a defense to a claim for 
added compensation. The fact situation in the Thorn case is 
distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Thorn the 
directed work was clearly outside the scope of the plans. It was 
an addition to the plans. In this case the staking of the 2 to 1 
slope beyond the specific waste area designated was considered by 
UDOT's engineer to be encompassed within the scope of the plans 
which required a 2 to 1 slope for fill sections where material 
was placed. This fact situation is more like the case of State 
v. Omeaa Painting. Inc.. 463 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. App. 1984) In that 
case, which involved changes directed by the state's engineer and 
a failure to notify the state in writing of any claim for relief, 
*R. 682, 683 and Exhibit #2-P, Sheet 1. 
47R. 653, 685, 686. 
20 
the court construed Indiana Standard Highway Specification Number 
105.16 which is identical to UDOT Standard Specification 
105.1748 set forth above. The Court stated the following: 
That section is clear and unambiguous. Absent the 
requisite written notification, the contractor is 
without recourse. When the terms of a contract are 
plain and clear on the face of the document, such terms 
are conclusive as to the meaning of the contract and 
this court will apply the contract's provisions 
according to the plain language of the document. 
Reeder vT Ramsey. 458 N.E.2d 682 (Ind. App. 1984). 
The court, after noting that the plaintiff did not 
dispute that it failed to notify the engineer in writing pursuant 
to the said section, states the following: 
Accordingly, the contractor is precluded from raising 
any claim for additional compensation unless it 
demonstrates that the State waived compliance with 
Section 105.16. This Omega has failed to do. Absent a 
showing of waiver, the parties must be deemed to be 
bound by the plain terms of the contract. See also 
Watson Lumber v. Guennewia. 226 N.E.2d 220 (111. App. 
1967). 
The waste disposal area was staked by the UDOT crew to 
reflect the required 2 to 1 slope. 
Procon was apparently not concerned about the waste 
area extension at the time it occurred (March 1986). Procon's 
superintendent, Bill Thomas, recorded in a field report dated 
March 19, 1986 that "We can make switchbacks longer now that 
waste area to south is to be expanded."49 
The engineer did not consider the waste area extension 
to provide the slope to be a compensable change. There was no 
*
BEx. 5-P, Sec. 105.17. 
49R. 138. 
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verbal discussion between the parties concerning it at any time 
during performance of the contract. This is exactly the 
situation which the two specification sections quoted above in 
subsection A contemplate. It is the intent of those 
specification sections that the owner be protected from claims 
which the contractor may decide to assert, after the fact and 
without prior written notice. 
C. Finding of Fact Number 21 Which Found 
That UDOT Was On Notice That The Change In 
The Waste Area Would Increase Procon's Cost 
Of Performance Is In Error Because UDOT Was 
Never Informed Either Verbally Or In Writing 
That Procon Intended To Claim Added 
Compensation For The Alleged Change During 
The Prpjectt 
Hugh Kirkham testified that he did not see Procon's 
letter dated April 14f 198650 which purports to put UDOT on 
notice of Procon's intent to claim added compensation, until a 
copy of the letter was handed to him several years after the 
project was performed during trial preparation.51 He testified 
that he checked UDOT files and records and that no original or 
copy of the letter exists in UDOT files. He stated that he had 
checked with his office manager and that he had not seen the 
letter either.52 He also stated that the mail was delivered 
directly to his office by U.S. Mail.53 Other pertinent 
50Ex. 18-P. 
51R. 657. 
52R. 657. 
53R. 659. 
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correspondence which Procon originated was apparently received in 
due course by UDOT. 
Hugh Kirkham testified in response to a question 
concerning a statement in the letter of April 14, 1986 from Larry 
Fillmore (Ex. 18-P) which refers to a telephone conversation and 
a "directed change in the designated waste area" that he did not 
recall any conversation about a "directed change" or "any 
conversation at all" and that, "I didn't feel we had changed the 
waste area because we were starting at the, what was the end of 
the waste area with our 2 to 1 slope."54 Kirkham stated that 
the first time he realized that Procon was concerned about the 
alleged change in the location of the waste fill area was during 
trial preparation in April of 1990 when he first saw the April 
14, 1986 letter.55 56 
The record of the trial in this matter is totally 
devoid of any evidence which relates to any verbal notice or 
discussion between any Procon representative and UD^T's Engineer 
Kirkham or any other UDOT official concerning the extension and/ 
54R. 658. 
55R. 417. 
56It should be noted that Procon's letter of April 14, 1986 
is referred to in the claim document filed by Procon (Ex. 34-P) 
after the contract with Procon was terminated. The claim was 
filed in late 1987 but Kirkham did not actually review the claim 
document in any detail until April 1990. The claim itself was 
filed by Procon with UDOT's chief construction engineer, Bert 
Taylor, and was not forwarded to Kirkham. The precise point in 
time that Kirkham discovered that Procon was concerned with the 
change is of course irrelevant if it occurred after contract 
performance which is in fact the case. 
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or change in the location of the waste-fill area. Finding of 
Fact Number 21 is therefore totally reliant on Exhibit 18-P. 
In order to challenge a finding of the Court based upon 
factual evidence, it is necessary to marshall all the evidence 
which the Court could conceivably rely upon to support its 
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings even when it is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the Court below. Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). We have already set out 
Kirkham's uncontroverted statements which deny that any notice of 
any kind was received by UDOT which relates to the waste area 
change or extension during contract performance. Jim Didericksen 
stated that he was notified of the alleged change by his people 
approximately March 20, 1986.57 Later in response to 
questioning on voir dire, Mr. Didericksen admitted that he did 
not talk to Kirkham about the April 14, 1986 letter. (Exhibit 
18-P.)58 He also testified that he did not send the said letter 
and that he did not know who would have sent the letter. He said 
he assumed "it would have been Mr. Fillmore or my wife or 
somebody. "59 
Valerie Didericksen in her testimony referred to a 
meeting with Kirkham near the end of May or the first of June 
1986 but did not make reference to any discussion concerning the 
57R. 306. 
58R. 317. 
59R. 317. 
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waste area or problems associated therewith.60 She did not 
testify concerning the April 14# 1986 letter or anything referred 
to in that letter. 
Larry Fillmore, the supposed author of the disputed 
April 14, 1986 letter did not testify at trial although it was 
represented by counsel for Procon on the first day of trial that 
he would.61 During the trial counsel for UDOT represented that 
during the deposition of the said Fillmore which was taken on 
September 1, 1989, he was asked concerning the April 14, 1986 
letter he purportedly authored, and that he did not recall the 
letter, nor facts and events referred to therein. Following the 
trial a Motion was brought by UDOT to reconsider the damage award 
and to amend the judgment. An excerpt from Fillmore's deposition 
was received as a late filed exhibit. In the deposition Fillmore 
was asked about the letter and the reference in the letter to 
"large material we have encountered and the location of the 
designated waste area"? In response to the specific question as 
to whether he had an independent recollection of either of the 
two specific items outside of the letter he stated: "I 
don't."62 
In paragraph 3 of the said letter, the purported author 
(Fillmore) states: "As I stated, we have been informed by Bill 
60
 R. 408-412. 
61R. 318. 
62R. 136. The transcript does not reflect the exact 
question. Counsel for UDOT was reading from the first paragraph 
of the letter which reads as stated. 
25 
Thomas of a directed change in the location of the wastefill area 
from that which is indicated on sheet 3 of the plans." When 
asked "Do you know what he's talking about there?" Fillmore 
responded as follows: "I don't, I can't recall the exact 
specifics on that."63 
Fillmore was asked added questions concerning the 
project and the waste fill area but did not recall anything about 
the letter, the events in the letter or anything related to that 
part of the work.64 
By way of summary as to the marshalling of evidence to 
support Finding of Fact 21# we have the following: 1} Evidence 
of the extension of the waste area to the east in order to 
accommodate a 2 to 1 slope which Kirkham stated as being required 
by the plans and necessary to support waste material placement 
within the designated stationing. 2) Kirkham's testimony that 
he did not consider the slope which was staked and placed to be 
outside the scope of the plans or to constitute a change which 
would justify added compensation since it was no more costly to 
place the material in the extension area than where the plans 
provided. 3) Kirkham's statements that no one associated with 
Procon ever verbally informed him of any concern about the waste 
area extension and that he was unaware of this concern until four 
years later when he first saw a copy of the April 14, 1986 
letter. 4) No evidence that anyone in Procon's organization 
63R. 137. 
"R. 136-139. 
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actually mailed the letter of April 14# 1986, or delivered a copy 
of same to UDOT or that UDOT received the letter either by mail 
or personal delivery during the project. 5) No evidence that 
anyone associated with Procon ever informed Kirkham or any UDOT 
official of any concern as to the placement, change or extension 
of the waste area beyond that shown in the plans during the life 
of the project. 6) Some indication that while the change in 
location was recognized by Procon on or before March 19, 1986, 
that it was not an unwelcome change. This is contrary to the 
statement in the April 14, 1986 letter to UDOT concerning adverse 
impact to Procon. 7) Finally, there is absolutely no evidence to 
support the authenticity of Exhibit 18 except the statement of 
Jim Didericksen that a copy of the letter was in the file and 
that their practice was to keep copies of correspondence.65 
There simply is no adequate foundation to support the court's 
decision to admit Exhibit 18. 
Finding of Fact 21 is based on the letter of April 14, 
1986 (Exhibit 18-P) and the notice purportedly given UDOT about 
the alleged change in the location of the waste area as contained 
therein. 
When Exhibit 18-P was offered through the witness James 
Didericksen it was objected to for lack of foundation. The Court 
properly excluded the letter at that point. Thereafter, 
Didericksen testified that a copy of the letter was kept in the 
'R. 318-320. 
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file and that this was the practice of the company.66 The Court 
subsequently stated when 18-P was again proffered as follows: 
"The testimony was that Mr, Didericksen stated that the letter 
was in his file, and in his records kept by the corporation, and 
that was the foundation you laid for that." The Court: then 
overruled UDOT's objection and received 18-P.67 The basis for 
its acceptance is thus as a business record. 
A leading case in this jurisdiction concerning the 
business record exception to the hearsay rule (Subsection (6), 
Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence) is State ex rel. Marquez. 560 
P.2d 342 (Utah 1977). In that case, the Court held that the 
general rule as to the admissibility of a record is that it is 
within the prerogative of the trial court to make the 
determination when a sufficient foundation has been laid. In the 
case of State v. Bertal. 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), the court set 
guidelines to determine a "sufficient foundation" and stated four 
things which are required to lay a foundation for a-business 
record. They are as follows: 
(1) The record must be made in the regular course of 
the business entity which keeps the records; (2) The 
record must have been made at the time of, or in close 
proximity to the occurrence of the act, condition or 
event recorded; (3) The evidence must support a 
conclusion that after recordation the document was kept 
under circumstances that would preserve its integrity; 
and (4) The sources of the information from which the 
entry was made and the circumstances of the preparation 
of the document were such as to indicate its 
trustworthiness. 
*R. 318-319. 
67R. 611. 
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UDOT submits that under the criteria set out in Bertal. the Court 
should have excluded 18-P. The letter in question was dated at 
least 26 days after Procon recognized the change which raises a 
question as to the second requirement under Bertal. but it is the 
fourth requirement which is of most concern because the 
"circumstances of the preparation of the document" do not 
indicate its trustworthiness since the purported author could not 
recall the letter or events referred to therein and Jim 
Didericksen did not know who prepared the letter or if the 
original of it was ever sent. 
The Court's Finding Number 21 is "clearly erroneous." 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets the standard 
for the legal sufficiency of a Finding of Fact. In pertinent 
part that Rule states: 
Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses . . . . 
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, 776 P.2d at 899, the court states: 
A finding attacked as lacking adequate 
evidentiary support is deemed "clearly 
erroneous" only if we conclude that the 
finding is against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Citing, In re Estate of Bartell. 
776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) (mem op.); State v. 
Mitchell, 769 P.2d 817 (Utah 1989); Western 
Kane County Special Service Dist. No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 
1987) and State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1987). 
Procon is not entitled to a recovery for extra costs 
associated with the waste area extension unless it can establish 
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that notice of its intention was properly communicated. Simply 
admitting the letter into evidence fails to establish the fact of 
notice. The evidence that the State did not receive notice is 
uncontroverted. Procon did not even establish who typed the 
letter, who addressed the envelope, or if the letter was mailed, 
and if mailed, who mailed it. It is therefore clearly error for 
the Court to find that UDOT was on notice of the fact that the 
change in the waste area location would increase Procon's cost of 
performance. For the Court to admit the letter as a '"business 
record" and to ignore the entire failure of all the other 
evidence to support the finding that UDOT was on notice is not 
only error but an abuse of discretion. 
Unlike the fact situation in the Thorn case, there is 
in this case no testimony concerning any oral communication about 
the change in the waste disposal area. The evidence rather shows 
that the engineer enlarged the disposal area to accommodate the 
slope and throughout the life of the project he did not receive 
any oral or written notice that Procon objected to it in anyway 
let alone considered that it was entitled to added compensation 
as a result. 
In summary, it is obvious that the Court should have 
excluded Exhibit 18-P for lack of foundation. The only 
conceivable foundational facts were that a copy of the letter was 
in the file and that their custom was to keep a copy of 
correspondence. Allowing the letter into evidence without 
anything to support it except minimal evidence of the custom of 
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Procon to keep copies of correspondence is an invitation for 
fraud. Nothing in Exhibit 18-P is supported by any credible 
evidence outside the letter itself. The Court clearly committed 
error in admitting the letter and using it as a basis for its 
finding that UDOT was on notice of Procon's intent to seek added 
payment for extending the waste disposal area. There is no 
evidence that UDOT received the letter or even knew of Procon's 
intent to claim compensation. In addition, Section 104.02(4) of 
the standard specifications68 requires not only written notice 
but a detailed description of how the directed change will impact 
the contractor including how its unit cost will be altered. 
Certainly Exhibit 18-P falls short of said requirement. 
Conclusion of Law number 1 is likewise in error in concluding 
that the State breached the contract by changing the waste area 
location without compensation. 
The judgment predicated on the fact that UDOT was on 
notice should be reversed and dismissed with prejudice in 
accordance with the contract terms which provide for a waiver of 
contractor claims for failure to give timely written notice. The 
principal sum of $507#300 plus interest on said sum all as 
included in the judgment entered in this matter should be 
deducted from the overall judgment, or in the alternative the 
court should order a new trial. 
^Ex. 5-Pf Sec. 104.02(4). 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR A CHANGE IN 
THE SLOPE ANGLE IS IN ERROR AND IS BASED ON 
PERJURED TESTIMONY 
The Court awarded Procon damages totaling $43#750.00 
for costs allegedly incurred as a result of a change in the slope 
angle in the "sliver cut" area of the project. This award is in 
error because Procon's representatives were informed of the 
change prior to bidding and had the opportunity to bid 
accordingly. 
The plans for the project called for the material in 
the "sliver cut" to be excavated at an angle of % to 1. The 
existing slope angle was approximately 1 to 1. UDOT's engineer, 
Kirkham, realized that the plans should have called for the 
excavation to match the angle of the existing slope.69 Kirkham 
testified that he informed all prospective bidders who came to 
view the project area prior to bid opening that the excavated 
slope would be changed to conform with the existing slope.70 
Kirkham stated that he so informed Procon's represent sit ives, Jim 
Didericksen and Larry Fillmore, of the said change.71 The 
record shows that stakes were in place in the "sliver cut" 
section at the time of the site visit by Didericksen cind 
Fillmore.72 Said stakes were placed to require a 1 to 1 slope 
69R. 639, 642, 643. 
70R. 643. 
71R. 643, 644, 649. 
^R. 634, 649. 
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and defined the upper limit of the excavation which was 
significantly further up the slope than it would have been had 
the stakes been placed to define a 5f to 1 angle.73 
Didericksen recorded in his notes concerning the site 
visit74 that "Mr. Kirkham, P.E. pointed out cut area by showing 
centerline stakes cut slope 1:1 to top approx. 200'..." He 
recorded under subparagraph J. entitled "General discussion of 
geology of his notes" the "sliver cut approx 200' above existing 
highway." On page 10, he recorded: "Cut area beginning at 
Sliver cut approx. 200' above exist rd. Maintain approx. 1:1 
slope." On page 11# Mr. Didericksen has a drawing which shows 
the cut area and notes "1:1 slope top 200' mountain."75 
Didericksen's deposition was taken on December 8, 1989. At that 
time Didericksen was specifically asked whether they were 
informed during the site visit that the slope removal would be at 
a 1:1 angle? His response was "I think Mr. Kirkham told us 
that."76 Subsequently when asked whether his bid notes in fact 
state 1 to 1 he stated: "He did say that on the job tour. I 
remember him saying that on the job tour."77 Subsequently he 
was asked about each of the notations in his bid notes which 
refer to a 1 to 1 slope and conceded that they were consistent 
nR. 640# 641. 
74Ex. 8-P, p. 7. 
^Ex. 8-P, pp. 9-11. 
76R. 959. 
^R. 960. 
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with what Kirkham told them on the job site tour prior to 
bidding.78 
Didericksen in his deposition claimed that ci telephone 
call was made to Kirkham after the site visit and prior to the 
time of bid and that Kirkham was asked about addenda to the 
contract and that he instructed Procon to bid the job as drawn, 
that there were no addenda.79 When pressed concerning this 
alleged conversation, Didericksen admitted he did not talk to 
Kirkham but that Larry Fillmore did. Fillmore did not testify at 
trial. Kirkham testified that he did not recall any contact with 
Procon or its representatives after the site visit and prior to 
the time of the bid.80 Kirkham did apparently tell bidders that 
he had requested that an addendum be issued.81 It is undisputed 
that good engineering practice would have been to issue an 
addendum for such a change prior to the bid. UDOT specifications 
do, however, allow the engineer to make such changes and require 
the contractor to perform the work as directed by the engineer 
subject to certain restrictions.82 
At the time of trial, Didericksen changed his story and 
when asked specifically whether it was his contention that Mr. 
Kirkham did not tell him that he would be required to take the 
78R. 960-966. 
™R. 959-966. 
^R. 650. 
81R. 649. 
^Ex. 5-P, Sec. 104.02. 
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material out on a 1:1 slope in the sliver cut area, he stated: 
"My contention is that I don't recall him saying that. And my 
contention is that my notes say that he did not. That I wrote 
down that the existing cut was on a 1:1.B83 The deposition of 
Didericksen was then published and Didericksen was referred to 
his deposition beginning at page 39s4 where he was questioned 
concerning the slope angle change. Didericksen then attempted to 
explain the inconsistency of his testimony at trial with his 
prior deposition and his bid notes. A fair assessment of all the 
evidence is that his trial testimony is not consistent with his 
deposition or his bid notes.85 
UDOT does not disagree with the premise that the trial 
judge can choose to believe one witness over another when there 
is a conflict in the evidence. UDOT does, however, object to the 
Court's decision to accept the testimony of James Didericksen 
when it appears to be perjured or at the least highly 
contradictory. 
It is obvious from all of the testimony that a 
discussion concerning the slope in the sliver cut occurred 
between Kirkham of UDOT and Procon's representatives, Didericksen 
and Fillmore at the time of the site visit. Kirkham says the 
conversation concerned a change in the slope angle from the #:1 
called for in the plans to the 1:1 angle which he intended to be 
^R. 619. 
^R. 959. 
85R. 620-622. 
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the angle of removal. The stakes which were in place in the cut 
section at the time of the site visit were consistent with the 
changed slope angle and Didericksen's bid notes are consistent 
with this change as is his deposition testimony. Didericksen's 
testimony in his deposition involving the assertion that a phone 
call was made by Fillmore of Procon to Kirkham after the site 
visit and prior to bid opening is suspect. Kirkham does not 
recall any such telephone call and his alleged direction to "bid 
it as drawn" is not consistent with his intent to change the 
slope angle and the fact it was staked in accordance with the 
change prior to the bid. The question is why would he contradict 
himself when he had already taken the effort to infornri bidders of 
the change as well as having his crew set the survey stakes to 
reflect the change in the slope angle? 
It is conceded that UDOT should have issued an 
addendum. It is also conceded that conversations prior to the 
execution of a contract are often considered as merged into the 
contract. The contract does not have an integration clause even 
though it defines the contract as including a number of documents 
such as the plans, standard specifications, special provisions, 
etc.86 It also requires a bidder to make a site visit and 
charges the bidder with things which are apparent.87 In this 
case that would be the fact of the change in the slope angle. 
Procon did have actual notice of the slope angle change. That 
^Ex. 5-P. Sec. 105.04. 
87Ex. 5-P, Sec. 102.05. 
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was obvious from the position of the slope stakes at the time of 
the site visit. It is also obvious from their own bid notes. 
The notice came from oral statements made by UDOT's engineer. 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in the case of Maryland 
Department of General Services v. Cherry Hill Sand & Gravel. 443 
A.2d 628 (Md. App. 1982), held that the parol evidence rule only 
applies where the parties to a written contract agree or intend 
that the writing shall be their whole agreement, and that in the 
absence of an integration clause an oral clarification by the 
owner's engineer was meant to be incorporated as part of the 
contract. Since Procon had notice of the change they could have, 
and no doubt did, bid accordingly. Thus the court's award of 
damages for the slope angle change constitutes a "windfall11 to 
Procon. The court's award is based on Didericksen's perjured 
testimony; it is, thus, clear that the trial court abused its 
discretion by accepting Didericksen's testimony which clearly 
contradicts his own bid notes, his own deposition testimony and 
the testimony of Hugh Kirkham as well as the physical location of 
the stakes in the cut section. 
It was apparent from the site visit required by the 
contract that the slope angle was changed from the angle 
specified in the plans. The placement of the stakes alone should 
have been enough to alert a competent contractor. In the case of 
Highland Construction vs. Stevenson, et al.. 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 
1981), the Plaintiff contractor was denied relief for a claimed 
change because the court determined that Highland had not 
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reviewed data referenced in plan documents which would have 
alerted them of the condition later encountered. That case 
differs from the present only in that here Procon was verbally 
informed rather than being required to review a referenced 
document to become informed. This court's ruling in Thorn Const, 
Co. v. UDOT. 508 P.2d 365 (1979) is support for UDOT's contention 
in this case. In Thorn, UDOT was held responsible for verbal 
statements made by a low level employee concerning a material 
site even though he had no training or experience in materials. 
It was held that his statements were a warranty as to the 
suitability of the material for the contractor's use. The 
reverse should apply. Kirkham's verbal notification to Procon's 
representatives that the plan slope angle was to be changed 
should be binding on the bidding contractor. This would bar 
recovery for the alleged change which Procon now claims it was 
not aware of contrary to the weight of the evidence. 
UDOT submits that on the basis of the facts in 
evidence, disregarding Didericksen's perjured testimony, that the 
damage award is inappropriate and the award of $43,750 should be 
reversed and stricken from the judgment together with accrued 
interest on said amount. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS INFLUENCED 
BY PASSION OR PREJUDICE AND BY UNWARRANTED 
FEELINGS OF SYMPATHY TOWARD THE RESPONDENT 
The original contract between Procon and UDOT was for 
the amount of $719,000. Procon was actually paid the sum of 
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$837,394.12.** The principal amount awarded to Procon by way of 
judgment in this matter is $721,478.00. In other words, the 
Court more than doubled the cost of the project. 
During argument of UDOT's Motion to Reconsider the 
Damage Award, the court expressed concern that even the grossly 
inflated amount of damages which he awarded Procon was perhaps 
not enough. Judge Young stated the following: "The frustration 
I've had with this case is really in the overall total amount. 
And I still didn't solve the problem because, as I recall, the 
plaintiff incurred losses of about 1.6 million and his claim was 
2.2 million initially in addition to that which he was paid which 
was approximately seven--well, he wasn't paid probably $719,000, 
was he? He was paid something less than that."89 
On two occasions during the trial the court, while not 
on the record, expressed feelings of sympathy for the plaintiff. 
The court was reminded of this during argument on UDOT's post-
trial motion90 and did not dispute the fact. 
UDOT employed Rollins, Brown and Gunnell (RB&G), an 
engineering firm to evaluate the claim filed by Procon. They in 
turn employed Norman Clyde, one of the principals of W.W. Clyde 
and Company, who is a civil engineer as well as an experienced 
contractor to assist in their evaluation. They also employed a 
law firm who has had experience in construction litigation to 
MR. 173. 
89R. 900-901. 
90R. 893. 
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assist in evaluating the claim by Procon. Rollins, Brown and 
Gunnell concluded that the plans that UDOT provided were adequate 
and that the changes in the plans by UDOT's engineer were not 
sufficient to provide a basis for Procon's various claims. Their 
conclusion was that Procon's problems and difficulties mainly 
related to improper or inefficient construction technique, lack 
of adequate equipment, and lack of know-how. They concluded that 
Procon was not entitled to any recovery.91 
In his memorandum decision, Judge Young specifically 
rejected the "recommendation of the evaluating group, and rejects 
the conclusion that the claim should be denied, "92 but: not 
until he had commented that the defendant had paid $65,000 to "an 
independent team to evaluate the claim. "93 Clearly, it is 
immaterial as to what UDOT paid to anyone for the purpose of 
evaluating Procon's outrageous claim of $2.2 million dollars. It 
is also noteworthy that the court while disclaiming that the 
total costs of $1,600,000 allegedly incurred by Procbn were the 
"basis for this decision"94 nevertheless awarded Procon judgment 
based upon the highest testimony presented by Procon's expert 
witnesses at trial and as noted above expressed frustration that 
this "didn't solve the problem" because the testimony was that 
Procon's total losses were 1.6 million dollars, and that Procon's 
91Ex. 34-P. 
92R. 104. 
*R. 103. 
*R. 103. 
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initial claim was 2.2 million dollars. Said figures were based 
on total cost projections and were not seriously pursued at 
trial. The court's disregard of the perjured testimony of Jim 
Didericksen as to the slope angle change in the sliver cut and 
its award of $43,750 for the change as discussed under Point II 
is a further indication of the court's passion and prejudice in 
this matter. 
This court has previously rejected the concept of total 
cost as a basis for recovery except when there is no feasible 
alternative and the claimant can show that it as not responsible 
for added expenses. (See Highland Construction Co. v. Union 
Pacific R. Co.. 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984)). The record in this 
case is replete with evidence of inefficiency both as to 
construction technique and equipment utilization so plaintiff's 
total costs are really immaterial insofar as a measure of damages 
for which UDOT should be responsible.95 The court quite clearly 
was persuaded that the inflated costs allegedly incurred by 
Procon were justified and the court appears to have concluded 
that the enormity of the alleged loss sustained by Procon some 
how justifies the damage award which was based on the testimony 
of Gaylord Gardner. Mr. Gardner's testimony as reflected by 
Exhibit 61-P was based on assumptions and conclusions which are 
not supported by the evidence and really amounts to pure 
speculation. UDOT objected its admittance for that reason but 
95R. 753-775. In addition, Ex. 65-D and Ex. 66-D which are 
diaries kept by UDOT's inspector Ferd Johnson which his testimony 
was based upon. 
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its objection was overruled,96 In that it failed to take into 
account actual conditions as they existed, including Procon's own 
internal problems, difficulties and inefficiencies which were not 
the fault of UDOT, it is subject to the same objections and 
criticism as is the total cost approach to damages. UDOT admits 
that for purposes of proving Procon's claims it would be 
appropriate to use the bid calculations as a starting point in 
attempting to establish how the actual project was changed. Mr. 
Gardner's figures and calculations were, according to his own 
admission, based on assumptions as to the actual work 
performed97 and should not have been admitted. Since they were 
based on assumptions which are not supported by the evidence, 
they are remote and speculative and inherently flawed to the 
extent they incorporate things which are attributable to Procon's 
own fault and are not entirely the fault or responsibility of 
UDOT. In the case of Brawley v. Esterley. Mo,, 267 S.W.2d, 655, 
659, the Missouri Court stated the following with regard to 
evidence based on assumptions: 
The evidence must exclude guesswork, 
conjecture, and speculation as to the 
existence of the necessary facts. Bates v. 
Brown Shoe Co.. 116 S.W.2d 31 (Mo.) when the 
inference of a fact essential to a 
plaintiff's recovery has no evidentiary 
basis, we, and a jury, may not speculate as 
to the existence of the essential fact--the 
word "speculate" being here used in the sense 
of reaching a conclusion by theorizing upon 
assume factual premises outside of and beyond 
96R. 530, 545, 547-551, 563-578. 
97R. 563-564. 
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the scope of the evidence. West v. St. Louis 
Public Svc. Co., 236 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Sup.) 
Since the court relied upon the testimony of Gaylord Gardner 
which Gardner admitted was based on assumptions, the judgment is 
flawed and should be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial, with instructions to dismiss claims related to the change 
in the waste disposal area and the sliver cut slope angle. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR OVERTIME 
WORK IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE, IS NOT EQUITABLE, AND RESULTS IN A 
PENALTY. 
The court awarded Procon $33,000 for overtime wages 
allegedly paid. Said award was based on the premise that UDOT's 
project engineer failed to respond to Procon's request for 
additional time allowance during the performance of the contract. 
Hugh Kirkham explained his reasons for not responding at 
trial.98 As a result of UDOT's failure to respond, Procon 
asserted that it incurred costs for overtime wages Which were 
necessary to expedite the work in an effort to complete the work 
on time. This type of claim is typically referred to as an 
acceleration claim. (For a discussion of the concept and its 
relation to delay, see Contracting & Materials Co. v. City of 
Chicago. 314 N.E.2d 598 (1974).) 
The contract provided for 90 working days to perform 
the work. UDOT does not charge time during the months of 
98R. 663-666, 686-688. 
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December, January, and February. Conditions during those 
months are such that little work can be accomplished. Work on 
the Clay Hills Project commenced in March, 1986, and continued 
into early 1987. At that time, Procon had completed the grading 
and drainage but not the paving of the roadway. Progress reports 
show that as of December 1, 1986 when time charges ceased that 
Procon had been charged 161 working days. The project was listed 
at 85% complete.100 
UDOT granted time extensions after the work was 
completed and prior to trial101 totaling 14.68 days. Deducting 
the 90 days allowed by the contract and the additional time 
allowed from the 161 days charged left a balance of 56.32 days of 
overtime which at the daily charge of $210.00 resulted in the 
assessment of liquidated damages totalling $11,827.20.102 
Liquidated damages were also assessed for the contractor's 
failure to meet requirements under the Disadvantaged Business 
Enterprise goal totaling $83,739.41. 
At trial, UDOT agreed to waive its counterclaim for 
both types of liquidated damages in deference to the time that 
would be required to present evidence at trial. This was 
discussed in chambers and counsel for UDOT assumed that the court 
understood the relationship between Procon's overtime charges and 
"Ex. 5 -P , S e c . 1 0 8 . 0 6 . 
100R. 1 6 6 . 
101R. 4 2 4 - 4 2 5 . 
102R. 1 6 9 . 
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the time charged by UDOT which supported its liquidated damage 
assessment. This was again raised in UDOT's Post Trial 
Motion103 in an effort to explain that Procon was still liable 
for liquidated damages even after a 60-day time extension. 
The court's Finding of Fact number 49 is in fact 
incorrect. Findings of Fact numbered 47 and 48, while 
technically correct, are misleading. The reason for this is that 
as explained above, UDOT had granted 14.68 days of added time 
after the project left Hugh Kirkham's control. The 60-day 
extension which Hugh Kirkham agreed would be reasonable is thus 
reduced to 45.32 days. When that period of time is deducted from 
the 56.32 days of liquidated damages actually assessed, it still 
leaves a total of 11 days of liquidated damages. UDOT therefore 
objected to Finding of Fact number 47 in its Post Trial 
Memorandum.104 
It is certainly error for the court to charge UDOT 
$33,000 in damages for alleged overtime paid by Procon when the 
project was still not completed at the time it was terminated in 
early 1987. It was 11 working days in excess of allowable time 
at that point even after UDOT conceded a 60-day time extension 
was likely due. 
At trial, UDOT was willing to concede the liquidated 
damages for time overrun because Hugh Kirkham had agreed that a 
>R. 119-121, 166, 169-173. 
H. 127-128. 
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60-working day time extension would have been reasonable.105 
Eleven Days at $210.00 per day only amounted to $2310.00. This 
concession certainly stopped short of conceding that UDOT should 
be liable for overtime incurred by the contractor in attempting 
to complete the work within allowable time limits when they only 
completed 85% of the total amount of work on the project.106 
UDOT respectfully submits that the court's award of 
$33,000 for overtime allegedly incurred by Procon should be 
reversed and Procon's claim should be ordered dismissed for the 
reason that it is not supported legally or equitably. It in fact 
results in an unwarranted penalty to UDOT. If Procon had 
completed the project within allowable time, then under the 
doctrine of constructive acceleration, it would be appropriate to 
consider compensation for overtime incurred in order to complete 
the work timely. Procon would , however, have to meet the 
elements of an acceleration claim. These are: (1) an excusable 
delay; (2) request for time; (3) refusal to grant the time; (4) 
express direction to accelerate performance; (5) actual 
acceleration; and (6) notice.107 (See Nat Harrison Associates, 
Inc. v. Gulf States Utilities Co.. 491 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1974). 
In this case, the doctrine does not apply because even 
when the contract time is extended by 60 days, and conceding for 
10
*R. 686-688. 
106R. 166. 
107See Bruner, Allen and Sand, Acceleration. Government 
Contractor Briefing Papers No. 81-2 (Federal Publications, 1981). 
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the sake of argument that Procon's overtime was incurred in an 
effort to accelerate performance, the contract was still only 85% 
complete when it was terminated. In addition, there was no 
evidence presented that UDOT directed Procon to accelerate its 
performance and there was no notice ever communicated to UDOT of 
the fact that Procon was in fact accelerating its performance and 
intended to hold UDOT responsible. The acceleration costs ought 
not to be charged to UDOT and by doing so the trial court has in 
effect penalized UDOT unfairly. The acceleration may have been 
to the benefit of Procon but not necessarily to UDOT. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred as a matter of law in admitting 
Procon's letter of April 14, 1986 (Ex. 18-P) into evidence when 
there was an inadequate foundation for said exhibit and in 
concluding that UDOT was on notice of Procon's intent to claim 
added compensation for extending the waste disposal area. There 
is no evidence to show that UDOT ever received the Tetter or that 
its engineer was ever informed of Procon's intent to claim 
compensation. The purported author of the said letter could not 
recall the letter or any of the items or events referred to in 
the letter. Under provisions of the contract, Procon's failure 
to notify UDOT timely and in writing constitutes a waiver of its 
right to claim added compensation for alleged damages associated 
with extending the waste area. The judgment based upon this 
alleged change in the amount of $507,300 should be reversed and 
the claim based on moving the waste area location should be 
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dismissed no cause of action or in the alternative UDOT should be 
entitled to a new trial. 
The lower court erred in awarding Procon damages 
totaling $43,750 for alleged damages incurred as a result of a 
change in the angle of the cut slope. Procon was informed of the 
change by verbal notice prior to the bid opening. The court's 
decision is based upon the testimony of Jim Didericksen, which 
testimony appears to be perjured. Didericksen's bid notes and 
his deposition testimony are consistent with the testimony of 
Hugh Kirkham, UDOT's engineer that Procon was informed of said 
change prior to bid opening. The state records establish that 
stakes were in place in the cut at the time of Procon's pre-bid 
site inspection and that they reflected the slope angle change. 
Didericksen's testimony at trial was directly contradictory to 
all the other evidence before the court. The court's award 
likely constitutes a double recovery. The Judgment of $43,750 
based upon Didericksen's perjured testimony should be reversed 
and the complaint should be dismissed as to said claim. 
The court erred in its award of $33,000 for alleged 
overtime wages which is based on its finding that Procon was 
entitled to more working days in time extension than were used to 
assess damages. That is factually incorrect. Even when 
allowance is made for the extension of time which UDOT's engineer 
conceded at trial, Procon exceeded allowable time by 11 working 
days and only completed 85% of the project. It is inequitable to 
award damages for overtime work by Procon when there was clearly 
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no benefit to UDOT. The doctrine of constructive acceleration 
does not support the court's decision. 
UDOT seeks a reversal of the judgment and a dismissal 
with prejudice as to the $507,300 awarded for the waste area 
change, $43,750 awarded for the slope angle change , and $33,000 
awarded for overtime, together with accrued interest on said sums 
as set forth in the judgment. 
Finally, UDOT asserts that the trial court acted 
unreasonably and that its award of damages is influenced by 
passion and prejudice as well as unwarranted feelings of sympathy 
toward Procon which is an affront to the concept of competitive 
bidding. At the very least, UDOT should be granted a new trial 
with appropriate instructions to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ff day of November, 1992. 
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